Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest VMs have the concept of
private and shared memory. Private memory is encrypted with the
guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted with hypervisor
key. Certain types of memory (namely instruction pages and guest page
tables) are always treated as private memory by the hardware.
For data memory, SEV guest VMs can choose which pages they would like
to be private. The choice is done using the standard CPU page tables
using the C-bit. When building the initial page table we mark all the
memory as private.
The patch sets the memory encryption PCD, the PCD is used by DxeCore
when building the initial page table.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 3 +
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 3 +
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 3 +
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 3 +
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 ++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c | 1 +
7 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
index 265f2d2b6d2f..139d54aa010e 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
@@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
+ # Set memory encryption mask
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
+
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
index 3b50a2dd2d2f..9403f76ce862 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
@@ -538,6 +538,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
+ # Set memory encryption mask
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
+
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
index 82c73331aa9f..e137143f7afa 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
+++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
@@ -537,6 +537,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
+ # Set memory encryption mask
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
+
!if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
index 53c6dd445a0e..a9a7a76c7325 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ [Defines]
#
[Sources]
+ AmdSev.c
Cmos.c
FeatureControl.c
Fv.c
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
QemuFwCfgLib
QemuFwCfgS3Lib
MtrrLib
+ MemEncryptSevLib
PcdLib
[Pcd]
@@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ [Pcd]
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPropertiesTableEnable
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiS3Enable
+ gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuLocalApicBaseAddress
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
index 18f42c3f0ea8..a7729b9df44b 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ XenDetect (
VOID
);
+VOID
+AmdSevInitialize (
+ VOID
+ );
+
extern BOOLEAN mXen;
VOID
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..26f7c3fdbb13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/**@file
+ Initialize Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
+
+ Copyright (c) 2017, Advanced Micro Devices. All rights reserved.<BR>
+
+ This program and the accompanying materials
+ are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
+ License which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license
+ may be found at http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
+
+ THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
+
+**/
+//
+// The package level header files this module uses
+//
+#include <PiPei.h>
+
+#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
+#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
+#include <Register/Cpuid.h>
+#include <Register/Amd/Cpuid.h>
+#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
+
+/**
+
+ Function checks if SEV support is available, if present then it sets
+ the dynamic PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask with memory encryption mask.
+
+ **/
+VOID
+EFIAPI
+AmdSevInitialize (
+ VOID
+ )
+{
+ CPUID_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_INFO_EBX Ebx;
+ UINT64 EncryptionMask;
+ RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus;
+
+ //
+ // Check if SEV is enabled
+ //
+ if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ //
+ // CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] Bit 0:5 (memory encryption bit position)
+ //
+ AsmCpuid (CPUID_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_INFO, NULL, &Ebx.Uint32, NULL, NULL);
+ EncryptionMask = LShiftU64 (1, Ebx.Bits.PtePosBits);
+
+ //
+ // Set Memory Encryption Mask PCD
+ //
+ PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask, EncryptionMask);
+ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
+
+ DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SEV is enabled (mask 0x%lx)\n", EncryptionMask));
+}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
index 5e983a8dcea9..5121e337bdcb 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
@@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ InitializePlatform (
NoexecDxeInitialization ();
}
+ AmdSevInitialize ();
MiscInitialization ();
InstallFeatureControlCallback ();
--
2.7.4
_______________________________________________
edk2-devel mailing list
edk2-devel@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 05/11/17 00:09, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest VMs have the concept of
> private and shared memory. Private memory is encrypted with the
> guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted with hypervisor
> key. Certain types of memory (namely instruction pages and guest page
> tables) are always treated as private memory by the hardware.
> For data memory, SEV guest VMs can choose which pages they would like
> to be private. The choice is done using the standard CPU page tables
> using the C-bit. When building the initial page table we mark all the
> memory as private.
>
> The patch sets the memory encryption PCD, the PCD is used by DxeCore
> when building the initial page table.
Please replace the last paragraph in the commit message with the
following (mostly based on
<http://mid.mail-archive.com/ec83b052-1af7-c985-35a3-0838c5943add@redhat.com>):
----
The patch sets the memory encryption PCD. The PCD is consumed by the
following edk2 modules, which manipulate page tables:
- PEI phase modules: CapsulePei, DxeIplPeim, S3Resume2Pei.
CapsulePei is not used by OVMF. DxeIplPeim consumes the PCD at the
end of the PEI phase, when it builds the initial page tables for the
DXE core / DXE phase. S3Resume2Pei does not consume the PCD in its
entry point function, only when DxeIplPeim branches to the S3 resume
path at the end of the PEI phase, and calls S3Resume2Pei's
EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI.S3RestoreConfig2() member function.
Therefore it is safe to set the PCD for these modules in PlatformPei.
- DXE phase modules: BootScriptExecutorDxe, CpuDxe, PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
They are all dispatched after the PEI phase, so setting the PCD for
them in PlatformPei is safe. (BootScriptExecutorDxe is launched "for
real" in the PEI phase during S3 resume, but it caches the PCD into a
static variable when its entry point is originally invoked in DXE.)
----
With that update,
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Thanks,
Laszlo
>
>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> ---
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf | 3 +
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h | 5 ++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c | 1 +
> 7 files changed, 80 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
> index 265f2d2b6d2f..139d54aa010e 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32.dsc
> @@ -530,6 +530,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
>
> + # Set memory encryption mask
> + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
> +
> !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
> index 3b50a2dd2d2f..9403f76ce862 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.dsc
> @@ -538,6 +538,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
>
> + # Set memory encryption mask
> + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
> +
> !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> index 82c73331aa9f..e137143f7afa 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.dsc
> @@ -537,6 +537,9 @@ [PcdsDynamicDefault]
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber|64
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds|50000
>
> + # Set memory encryption mask
> + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask|0x0
> +
> !if $(SMM_REQUIRE) == TRUE
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmSyncMode|0x01
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuSmmApSyncTimeout|100000
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> index 53c6dd445a0e..a9a7a76c7325 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ [Defines]
> #
>
> [Sources]
> + AmdSev.c
> Cmos.c
> FeatureControl.c
> Fv.c
> @@ -60,6 +61,7 @@ [LibraryClasses]
> QemuFwCfgLib
> QemuFwCfgS3Lib
> MtrrLib
> + MemEncryptSevLib
> PcdLib
>
> [Pcd]
> @@ -94,6 +96,7 @@ [Pcd]
> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSetNxForStack
> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPropertiesTableEnable
> gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiS3Enable
> + gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuLocalApicBaseAddress
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber
> gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
> index 18f42c3f0ea8..a7729b9df44b 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.h
> @@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ XenDetect (
> VOID
> );
>
> +VOID
> +AmdSevInitialize (
> + VOID
> + );
> +
> extern BOOLEAN mXen;
>
> VOID
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..26f7c3fdbb13
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
> +/**@file
> + Initialize Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support
> +
> + Copyright (c) 2017, Advanced Micro Devices. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +
> + This program and the accompanying materials
> + are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD
> + License which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license
> + may be found at http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
> +
> + THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
> + WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
> +
> +**/
> +//
> +// The package level header files this module uses
> +//
> +#include <PiPei.h>
> +
> +#include <Library/DebugLib.h>
> +#include <Library/PcdLib.h>
> +#include <Register/Cpuid.h>
> +#include <Register/Amd/Cpuid.h>
> +#include <Library/MemEncryptSevLib.h>
> +
> +/**
> +
> + Function checks if SEV support is available, if present then it sets
> + the dynamic PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask with memory encryption mask.
> +
> + **/
> +VOID
> +EFIAPI
> +AmdSevInitialize (
> + VOID
> + )
> +{
> + CPUID_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_INFO_EBX Ebx;
> + UINT64 EncryptionMask;
> + RETURN_STATUS PcdStatus;
> +
> + //
> + // Check if SEV is enabled
> + //
> + if (!MemEncryptSevIsEnabled ()) {
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + //
> + // CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] Bit 0:5 (memory encryption bit position)
> + //
> + AsmCpuid (CPUID_MEMORY_ENCRYPTION_INFO, NULL, &Ebx.Uint32, NULL, NULL);
> + EncryptionMask = LShiftU64 (1, Ebx.Bits.PtePosBits);
> +
> + //
> + // Set Memory Encryption Mask PCD
> + //
> + PcdStatus = PcdSet64S (PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask, EncryptionMask);
> + ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
> +
> + DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SEV is enabled (mask 0x%lx)\n", EncryptionMask));
> +}
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
> index 5e983a8dcea9..5121e337bdcb 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/Platform.c
> @@ -678,6 +678,7 @@ InitializePlatform (
> NoexecDxeInitialization ();
> }
>
> + AmdSevInitialize ();
> MiscInitialization ();
> InstallFeatureControlCallback ();
>
>
_______________________________________________
edk2-devel mailing list
edk2-devel@lists.01.org
https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
On 05/11/2017 09:37 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote: > > Please replace the last paragraph in the commit message with the > following (mostly based on > <http://mid.mail-archive.com/ec83b052-1af7-c985-35a3-0838c5943add@redhat.com>): > > ---- > The patch sets the memory encryption PCD. The PCD is consumed by the > following edk2 modules, which manipulate page tables: > > - PEI phase modules: CapsulePei, DxeIplPeim, S3Resume2Pei. > > CapsulePei is not used by OVMF. DxeIplPeim consumes the PCD at the > end of the PEI phase, when it builds the initial page tables for the > DXE core / DXE phase. S3Resume2Pei does not consume the PCD in its > entry point function, only when DxeIplPeim branches to the S3 resume > path at the end of the PEI phase, and calls S3Resume2Pei's > EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI.S3RestoreConfig2() member function. > > Therefore it is safe to set the PCD for these modules in PlatformPei. > > - DXE phase modules: BootScriptExecutorDxe, CpuDxe, PiSmmCpuDxeSmm. > > They are all dispatched after the PEI phase, so setting the PCD for > them in PlatformPei is safe. (BootScriptExecutorDxe is launched "for > real" in the PEI phase during S3 resume, but it caches the PCD into a > static variable when its entry point is originally invoked in DXE.) > ---- > I will update the patch description, thanks for the write up. -Brijesh _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
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