hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used.
Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes
were transmited.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru>
---
hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644
--- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
+++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
@@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q)
*/
assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len);
if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) {
+ if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) {
+ virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid");
+ virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0);
+ g_free(elem);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
out_sg, out_num,
0, n->host_hdr_len);
--
2.43.0
ping
https://patchew.org/QEMU/20240527133140.218300-2-frolov@swemel.ru/
On 27.05.2024 16:31, Dmitry Frolov wrote:
> A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used.
> Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes
> were transmited.
>
> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru>
> ---
> hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
> index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644
> --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
> +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
> @@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q)
> */
> assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len);
> if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) {
> + if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) {
> + virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid");
> + virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0);
> + g_free(elem);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
> out_sg, out_num,
> 0, n->host_hdr_len);
Дмитрий Фролов <frolov@swemel.ru> writes:
> ping
>
> https://patchew.org/QEMU/20240527133140.218300-2-frolov@swemel.ru/
>
> On 27.05.2024 16:31, Dmitry Frolov wrote:
>> A crash found while fuzzing device virtio-net-socket-check-used.
>> Assertion "offset == 0" in iov_copy() fails if less than guest_hdr_len bytes
>> were transmited.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Frolov <frolov@swemel.ru>
>> ---
>> hw/net/virtio-net.c | 6 ++++++
>> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/hw/net/virtio-net.c b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
>> index 24e5e7d347..603b80a50a 100644
>> --- a/hw/net/virtio-net.c
>> +++ b/hw/net/virtio-net.c
>> @@ -2783,6 +2783,12 @@ static int32_t virtio_net_flush_tx(VirtIONetQueue *q)
>> */
>> assert(n->host_hdr_len <= n->guest_hdr_len);
>> if (n->host_hdr_len != n->guest_hdr_len) {
>> + if (iov_size(out_sg, out_num) < n->guest_hdr_len) {
>> + virtio_error(vdev, "virtio-net header is invalid");
>> + virtqueue_detach_element(q->tx_vq, elem, 0);
>> + g_free(elem);
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + }
Isn't this basically another case for goto detach?
Although the use of goto's here is a bit of a code smell. I wonder if
there is any way to better structure this function and take care of the
auto-freeing of elements?
>> unsigned sg_num = iov_copy(sg, ARRAY_SIZE(sg),
>> out_sg, out_num,
>> 0, n->host_hdr_len);
--
Alex Bennée
Virtualisation Tech Lead @ Linaro
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