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Hallyn" , Arnd Bergmann , Masahiro Yamada , Kees Cook , Ard Biesheuvel , "=?UTF-8?q?Andreas=20F=C3=A4rber?=" , Ingo Molnar , Olof Johansson , Marc Zyngier , Andrew Morton , Mike Rapoport , David Brazdil , James Morse , Mark Rutland , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input) Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org X-ZohoMail-DKIM: pass (identity @google.com) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This patch adds CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn on -mharden-sls=3Dall, which mitigates the straight-line speculation vulnerability, speculative execution of the instruction following some unconditional jumps. Notice -mharden-sls=3D has other options as below, and this config turns on the strongest option. all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are impl= emented. none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation. retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and = BR instructions. blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instru= ctions. Links: https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221 https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404 https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processo= r-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processo= r-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2 Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor Suggested-by: David Laight Suggested-by: Will Deacon Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor Signed-off-by: Jian Cai --- Changes v2 -> v3: Modify linker scripts as Nick suggested to address boot failure (verified with qemu). Added more details in Kconfig.hardening description. Disable the config by default. arch/arm/Makefile | 4 ++++ arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h | 4 ++++ arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 1 + arch/arm64/Makefile | 4 ++++ arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 5 +++++ security/Kconfig.hardening | 10 ++++++++++ 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile index 4aaec9599e8a..11d89ef32da9 100644 --- a/arch/arm/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm/Makefile @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS +=3D -D__ARMEL__ KBUILD_LDFLAGS +=3D -EL endif =20 +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) +KBUILD_CFLAGS +=3D -mharden-sls=3Dall +endif + # # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 = and # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and s= igned diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmli= nux.lds.h index 4a91428c324d..c7f9717511ca 100644 --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h @@ -145,3 +145,7 @@ __edtcm_data =3D .; \ } \ . =3D __dtcm_start + SIZEOF(.data_dtcm); + +#define SLS_TEXT \ + ALIGN_FUNCTION(); \ + *(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*) diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index f7f4620d59c3..e71f2bc97bae 100644 --- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SECTIONS .text : { /* Real text segment */ _stext =3D .; /* Text and read-only data */ ARM_TEXT + SLS_TEXT } =20 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile index 90309208bb28..ca7299b356a9 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Makefile +++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile @@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils) endif endif =20 +ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y) +KBUILD_CFLAGS +=3D -mharden-sls=3Dall +endif + cc_has_k_constraint :=3D $(call try-run,echo \ 'int main(void) { \ asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295)); \ diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.ld= s.S index 4c0b0c89ad59..f8912e42ffcd 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -93,6 +93,10 @@ jiffies =3D jiffies_64; #define TRAMP_TEXT #endif =20 +#define SLS_TEXT \ + ALIGN_FUNCTION(); \ + *(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*) + /* * The size of the PE/COFF section that covers the kernel image, which * runs from _stext to _edata, must be a round multiple of the PE/COFF @@ -144,6 +148,7 @@ SECTIONS HIBERNATE_TEXT TRAMP_TEXT *(.fixup) + SLS_TEXT *(.gnu.warning) . =3D ALIGN(16); *(.got) /* Global offset table */ diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index 269967c4fc1b..e70f227019e1 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -121,6 +121,16 @@ choice =20 endchoice =20 +config HARDEN_SLS_ALL + bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening" + default n + def_bool $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=3Dall) + help + Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening on ARM and AR= M64 + architectures. It inserts speculation barrier sequences (SB or DSB+ISB + depending on the target architecture) after RET and BR, and replacing + BLR with BL+BR sequence. + config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE bool "Report forcefully initialized variables" depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK --=20 2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog